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THINK PIECES 
Liminality, possibility, and 
imperative 
Performing the other in face transplantation  
Samuel Taylor-Alexander 
Abstract 
This piece seeks to expand the notion of liminality within medical anthropology by shifting 
attention to how in-between states are actively produced and performed by medical experts. 
While medical anthropologists have successfully engaged with the notion of liminality to 
make sense of patient experience, I suggest that it holds broader potential and can be used to 
examine the production of medico-political imperatives by clinical elites. To do this, I trace 
shifting ideas surrounding the need to utilize face transplantation as it relates to the 
promotion of an institutionally produced category – the ideal patient. While once the 'ideal 
patient' was seen as a panacea to the ethical issues at stake in the performance of the 
operation, it arguably now works to limit the ability of surgeons to utilize face transplants to 
reconstruct the appearances of severely disfigured people. In response, leading face 
transplant surgeons tactically emphasize the problematizing state of their patients who 
occupy the limen of life and death. They ascribe sick roles to individuals in order to afford 
agentive, moral force to (bio)ethically fraught experimental medicine. 
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In the lead-up to performing the first face transplantation in the United States, Dr. Maria 
Siemionow of the Cleveland Clinic provided a comparative study of facial versus kidney 
function, writing: 
This comparison will ultimately show that the face is indeed an organ, with highly specific 
functions that enable human beings to negotiate the complex social routines that are essential 
for daily life. … In sum, although transplantation of solid organs is essential for a patient’s 
physical survival, face allotransplantation is essential both for physical and social survival. 
(Siemionow and Sonmez 2008, 346, 345)  
The authors of this text implicitly state that the purpose of face transplantation is both to 
better the ability of patients to eat, breathe, speak, et cetera, and, in line with a broader 
movement in medicine, to improve the quality of life of the patient. They go so far as to 
suggest that the former is all but worthless without the latter: ‘Optimal social survival is what 
makes physical life worth living (Siemionow and Sonmez 2008, 345). Face transplantation is 
presented as akin to other forms of organ transplantation with the superadded benefit of 
social survival. 
Publications in professional medical journals, such as the one above, emphasize the 
problematic status of patients with severe facial deformities. These texts promote a 
confluence between the face, biological life, and a life worth living. In doing so, they 
emphasize the problematic status of patients who, without the operation, we are told, will 
continue on in the sick role. In an article entitled ‘A Position Paper in Support of Face 
Transplantation in the Blind’ the authors, from Boston’s Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 
write: 
The centrality of the face is universally recognized; as noted by Alexander, ‘The face is 
essential. … [I]t is the essence of the person it identifies and a mark of shared humanity’. The 
capacity of the face to manifest this quality is derived from its status as a conduit for multiple 
functionalities far in excess of its aesthetic dimensions; indeed, the face simultaneously 
provides the means to effect oral competence, olfaction, phonation, ocular protection, air 
humidification, nonverbal communication, expression of emotion and sexuality, perception, 
and the conveyance of social information. (Carty et al. 2012, 319) 
In this extract, the face is presented as fundamental to social and biological life; individuals 
with severe facial disfigurement are discursively coded as nonpersons that exist outside of 
shared humanity. They are liminal beings, we might say, and their status makes imperative 
the need to intervene in a way that will restore their personhood and allow them to 
participate in the human world. In this essay I develop the notion of liminality by drawing 
attention to the reflexive construction of patients as incomplete human beings.  
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I have recently joined an interdisciplinary team that is engaging the concept of liminality to 
examine regulation and health research, in order to explore the spaces between policy and 
practice. This has challenged me to move back to again analyze the relation between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ in face transplantation, between ideal patients and the imperative to treat them using 
the procedure.1 In his seminal study, Victor Turner (1969, 95) writes that liminal objects, 
people or other material entities, move ‘through the network of classifications that normally 
locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they 
are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and 
ceremony’. Medical anthropologists have utilized the notion of liminality to make sense of 
sickness and the corresponding stigma experienced by people whose conditions 
problematize fundamental ideas in biomedicine and corresponding notions of personhood 
(for example, Honkasolo 2001; Jackson 2005; Jaye and Fitzgerald 2012). Drawing on 
Turner’s work, literary theorist Susan Squier (2004) similarly argues that a central feature of 
‘liminal lives’, such as ‘excess embryos’ resulting from in vitro fertilization, is how they 
inherently trouble existing categories of being. In revealing the instability of social categories, 
liminal entities threaten established social order and thus become the site of reflection, 
governance, and political action. Following these studies, I offer up a thought experiment, at 
the center of which is a question: what if liminal states are discursively produced and 
performed in proxy by medical experts in order to evoke a sociopolitical response?  
Many anthropologists examining questions of biotechnology have come to draw on the 
work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) who reminds us there was no single 
word for describing ‘life’ in the Greek philosophical tradition. Rather, they employed two 
semantically different terms: ‘Bios’ referring to an appropriate form of life for groups and 
individuals that is inherently social, and ‘Zoë’, or ‘bare life’, the simple act of being alive. This 
distinction has proved fruitful in ethnographic analyses, drawing scholarly attention to how 
contemporary notions of ‘life’ are continually problematized and remade with scientific and 
technological developments. As Paul Rabinow (1999) has written, it is increasingly apparent 
that this classical distinction is itself being outmoded by contemporary scientific 
 
1 I have written extensively about how the delineation of patient types has been a central feature in ‘making 
ethical’ face transplant surgery (Taylor-Alexander 2014a, 2014b). This writing was based on my interviews 
with a team of Mexican surgeons and legal specialists, who developed Latin America’s first face transplant 
protocol, alongside publications by patients, bioethics personnel, and medical experts. Doing this allowed me 
to show how the confluence of material technologies, human biology, institutionalized forms of reason 
(bioethics), and longstanding professional imperatives (the Hippocratic Oath) resulted in a new kind of 
patient: the ideal face transplant candidate. 
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biomedicine. We might say that, through surgeons like Maria Simeionow, face 
transplantation has brought Bios and Zoë into a particular relationship: in emphasizing that 
patients with severe deformities occupy a liminal space between life and death, face 
transplantation calls into question the responsibility of biomedicine and corollary state 
institutions to provide the operation to patients. 
The centrality of the face in the making of the industrialized human subject has been the site 
of intense reflection and scrutiny.2 While these works differ on whether the face has an 
inherent character that truly represents the individual self, collectively they demonstrate that 
the face is embedded and manipulated within hierarchical sets of sociopolitical relationships. 
The face has emerged as key to everyday modes of understanding self and other, and is thus 
often the site of manipulation and management (Butler 2006). Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari (1987) write of ‘facialization’, the historical (over)coding of the face as representing 
the self that marginalizes any competing attempt to reimagine a human identity vis-à-vis the 
body as a whole. The face, they write, ‘is not content to cover the head, but touches all other 
parts of the body’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 170, emphasis in original). Moreover, as a 
sociopolitical ‘machine’, the process of facialization that posits the face as the marker of the 
self is central to the making of the capitalist subject. 
While there is much of interest in this body of literature, I want to draw attention to the 
centrality of the face to our understandings of the human self and how this is being 
reproduced in and by face transplantation. Face transplantation involves removing a 
composite graft of hard and soft facial tissue from a brain-dead donor and transplanting it to 
a person whose face has been damaged through trauma such as a gunshot wound or animal 
attack. Reconstructive surgeons transplant autologous tissue (the patient’s own tissue) on a 
daily basis. The particularities of trauma or congenital malformation often require them to 
move, reshape, and repurpose parts of an individual’s body in order to reconstruct the 
patient’s face. Face transplantation was first proposed as a means to overcome the limits of 
surgical reconstruction connected to the unavailability of sufficient and appropriate 
biological tissue for surgical restoration. That is, face transplantation was proposed as a 
therapeutic option for patients whose face could not be completely restored using traditional 
reconstructive methods. 
From the outset, the suggestion of offering the procedure provoked ethical concerns 
because, as with the transplantation of solid organs, patients would be required to commit to 
 
2 Thinkers including Emmanuel Lévinas (1985), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987), and Judith Butler 
(2006) have all spent significant time reflecting on the importance of the face in contemporary forms of 
sociality. 
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a lifelong course of potentially fatal immunosuppressant therapy in order to counter 
biological rejection of the transplanted graft. While concerns were raised about how patients 
would cope with living with another person’s facial tissue in place of their own, the key 
ethical question that was raised can be phrased in the following way: ‘Is it ethical to offer 
patients with non-life (biologically) threatening conditions a potentially fatal treatment in 
order to improve their quality of life?’ At stake in this question are broader issues of what 
kind of life it is that patients with mutilated faces have and what can and should be done, 
within established forms of ethical reason, to offer them an appropriate form of life. 
Moreover, the technological capacities related to the surgery reframed the lives of potential 
patients, transforming them into the object of political, medical, and ethical reflection. 
In face transplantation, those in favor of the procedure strategically emphasized how 
potential patients existed as incomplete persons whose social life made their physical life not 
worth living. But the dependence on immunosuppression to counter transplant rejection 
risks destroying patients’ existing biological life, compromising the Hippocratic Oath that 
underlies medical ethics: ‘first, do no harm’. A broad consensus was reached within the 
medical community that if face transplantation was to occur then only certain patients could 
ethically be operated upon. In order to mitigate the prevailing epistemic and ethical 
constraints surrounding the procedure, a new type of ‘ideal patient’ was constructed. The 
psychology of the face transplant patient, and their biology, must exhibit certain qualities, 
must exist in a certain balance between normal and pathological. It is in this balance that 
they become operable and ethical because they conform to the very guidelines and 
arguments that (re)produce them in light of current epistemic, ethical, and technological 
practices (Taylor-Alexander 2014a). 
The Royal College of Surgeons, for example, offered an overall cautioning of the use of the 
procedure while introducing specific guidelines for selecting ‘suitable candidates for face 
transplantation’. These were organized into six key points: (1) the patient’s motivation for 
seeking the treatment and their expectations of the outcome; (2) their prior engagement with 
other, ‘less risky’ potential solutions, especially psychological intervention; (3) the 
psychological stability and capacity for readjustment of the prospective patient: they ‘should 
be sufficiently resilient to cope with the considerable stress associated with the transplant, 
including the “unknowns” associated with a new procedure of this nature, the complex 
immunological and behavioral post-operative regimen, [and] the risks of rejection’; (4) their 
‘level of cognitive functioning ... should be sufficiently good to understand and assimilate 
complex risk/benefit information’; (5) the patient must demonstrate ‘adherence credentials’; 
and (6) the patient must have a strong social support network in order to ‘buffer’ them 
against stresses during and after the procedure (Royal College of Surgeons, 2006, 16). 
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In my work in Mexico, I was interested in the category of ‘ideal patient’ as a boundary 
object, as something that was both flexible enough to travel between different institutional 
(and international) settings, and stable enough to remain significant and influential as it did 
so (Star and Griesemer 1989). This drew my attention to how the frame altered the relation 
between a team of reconstructive surgeons and one of their patients: it produced a sense of 
obligation to develop a face-transplant protocol in order to be able to use the latest medical 
therapeutic to treat patients. These surgeons reworked the selection guidelines offered by the 
Royal College of Surgeons, using them to classify groups of suitable and unsuitable patients 
(Taylor-Alexander 2014a).  
While constantly aiming to understand what face transplant means inter alia for surgeons 
and for patients with facial disfigurement, I have endeavored to remain critical of the 
operation. In a written interview with a freelance journalist from Reuters Health, I was asked 
about my thoughts on whether the operation should be taking place, considering the fatality 
rate (then 11 percent). My unpublished response was as follows:  
In allowing the operation to take place, all involved – patients, doctors, and institutional 
bureaucracy – are making a judgment call regarding not just the value of the operation as a 
therapeutic tool. Implicitly, they are commenting on the value of a life lived with a severe 
craniofacial condition. The value of such a life doesn’t appear very high when the medical 
community are willing to risk an individual dying in order to make them more normal, to offer 
them a life that correlates with what the Greeks called bios. Importantly, one could argue that in 
so devaluing such a life, face transplantation discursively grows in importance: the message is 
that restoring the anatomy of a person with such a condition is so important that it is worth 
risking death to achieve it, worth sacrificing a life lived with an abnormal face. 
I include my above comments as an aid to this thought experiment. The delineation of an 
ideal patient type allowed surgeons and ethics boards to negotiate epistemic unknowns, 
minimize risks, and increase potential benefits, and ultimately allow face transplantation to 
pass as ethical. I have no fixed opinion as the whether the operation should be taking place; 
it is happening. Nonetheless, we need to be aware of its consequences, positive, fatal, and 
otherwise. We need to be aware and to take into account how face transplantation is 
remaking understandings of health and life along with the anatomy of patients. One 
consequence is an implicit change in the meaning of facial deformity. According to the 
reconstructive surgeons cited at the beginning of this piece, surgeons who are key actors in 
this emerging experimental field, face transplantation is life saving beyond other forms of 
organ transplantation. Together with their clinical efforts, they are marking people with 
incomplete appearances as incomplete persons, as subjects requiring intervention. The 
message that lies between the lines of their position statements and biological comparisons is 
that people without a complete, fully recognizable, and functional face exist in state of 
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permanent marginalization. In making this argument, they are reframing debate on face 
transplantation: it is no longer about improving quality of life; it is about saving the life of 
patients.  
 
In his classic study of stigma and difference, Erving Goffman (1963, 3) describes how 
people with physical deformities are often thought about as incomplete, ‘tainted, and 
discounted’ persons. Extending this analysis through her ethnography of a New England 
chronic pain clinic, anthropologist Jean Jackson (2005) argues that stigmatization also occurs 
when people straddle established ontological boundaries (see also Becker 1963). Because 
they exist indefinitely in the sickness role, on the limen of life and death, chronic pain 
patients are:  
ambiguous beings seen by those around them to threaten prevailing definitions of the social 
order [because] certain features of chronic pain result in the perception of sufferers as 
transgressing the categorical divisions between mind and body and as confounding the codes 
of morality surrounding sickness and health, turning them into liminal creatures whose 
uncertain ontological status provokes stigmatizing reactions in others. (Jackson 2005, 332) 
In this passage, Jackson points to how chronic pain patients call into play established 
boundaries – between mind and body, health and sickness – deepening the stigmatizing 
impact of their condition.  
With face transplantation, surgeons have strategically emphasized how potential patients 
exist as incomplete persons who straddle the limen of life and death. The actor network-
based approach I used in my earlier analysis of the field revealed that the face transplant 
assemblage coproduced the ideal patient of face transplant surgery. Paying attention to the 
ontological uncertainty of such patients allows us to see how liminality is performed, 
emphasized, and seized on by doctors and surgeons in order to make imperative 
experimental medicine. Here we can draw a useful contrast between the example of chronic 
pain sufferers where their stigmatization results from their liminal status and its troubling of 
established boundaries such as healthy and sick, body and mind, and the status of face 
transplant patients.  
The stigmatization experienced by people without complete faces, by ‘incomplete beings’, is 
stressed in order to produce a medical imperative. As surgeons like Siemionow and her peers 
suggested that the role of medicine is pointless if doctors cannot offer patients a life worth 
living, while noting that careful patient selection can move the risks and benefits of face 
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transplantation in favor of its performance, they came to further emphasize, and stabilize, 
the liminal status of persons with severe deformities. By symbolically deepening the 
stigmatizing dimensions of facial trauma, its dehumanizing effects were harvested as a 
resource to negotiate the ethical constraints surrounding the procedure. As a result, new 
categories of person were drawn up as potential recipients were classified using those 
categories; psychologists, social workers, and surgeons all examined the balance of health 
and sickness of their disfigured patients. 
Medical anthropologists have developed the notion of embodiment in order to understand 
illness experience and the vicissitudes of what it is to have, and to be, a body. In thinking 
about the liminal status afforded to patients with facial disfigurement, I was reminded of an 
article by Carolyn Rouse (2004), in which she examines how parents and doctors struggle 
over the meaning and value of a dying child. In doing so, she offers the notion of 
‘embodiment by proxy’ to draw attention to the ‘process of embedding oneself in a 
meaningful array of symbols’ in order to augment one’s (nonmedical) authority and status 
within a system of individual and institutional hierarchies: 
As a concept, ‘embodiment-by-proxy’ relates to Webb Keane’s analysis of the development of 
semiotic ideologies, or how ideologies become embodied in ‘representational economies’ 
(2003: 423). These semiotic ideologies are, as Keane notes, ‘not just about signs, but about 
what kinds of agentive subjects and acted-upon objects might be found in the world’ (2003: 
423). These signs have the potential to instigate action and, therefore, they have material force 
[…] For the parents of this dying child, the unstated hope was that, through association with 
particular signs and the reshaping of their own dispositions, they would clarify their moral 
character to those with the power to keep their child alive. (Rouse 2004, 515) 
In this example, Rouse draws our attention to how individuals in the clinic are able to 
tactically perform and align their bodies and self within a ‘representational economy’ in order 
to alter the symbolic weight value of the life they care for.  
In drawing on and reinscribing the relationship between face and self, transplant surgeons 
have, similarly, been engaged in a process analogous to the ‘embodiment by proxy’ described 
by Rouse. They have been performing the liminality of patients with disfigurement, moving 
them to a space on the threshold of life and death. The face is made ‘to cover the entire 
body’ when it is presented as the common essence of humanity and as central to complete 
personhood. In their writing on faciality and la puissance du visage, Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 
175) state: ‘We are certainly not saying that the face, the power of the face, engenders and 
explains social power’. Rather, examining how the face has come, and continues, to stand in 
for the self is presented as an avenue to understand contemporary forms of subjectification. 
Liminal subjects reveal and in doing so threaten existing social structures, becoming the site 
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of intense scrutiny and reflection. Using the notion of liminality to rethink the relationship 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in face transplantation, between ideal patients and the imperative to 
operate, I have come to meditate on the role of marginalized selves in the reproduction of 
medical legitimacy and the production of technical need. While medical anthropologists have 
successfully engaged with the notion of liminality to make sense of patient experience, I wish 
to suggest that it holds broader potential and can be used to examine the production of 
medical imperatives. At the very least, it provides a useful lens for thinking about how sick 
roles are inscribed in individuals in order to afford agentive, moral force to (bio)ethically 
fraught experimental medicine.  
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